In international relations even nations with competing interests have strong incentives to interact with each other. Recently, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Modi met each other on the sidelines of the 18th BRICS Summit that fueled speculation that two sides are inching closer to a possible normalization. However, that is not the case. There are still deeper dynamics that continue to shape bilateral relations between the two Asian countries. Xi’s meeting with Modi can be interpreted as part of Beijing’s “multilateral diplomacy“ than as an indication of “rapprochement.“ The geo-political realities, unresolved conflicts, and competing regional interests continue to influence the strategic competition between them.
The ‘timeline’ itself is the first reason that shows that this isn’t a reset. Chinese President Xi has not visited New Delhi since his second informal Summit with Modi in October 2019 in Mamallapuram, Tamil Nadu. The bilateral relationship further nosedived after the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020. As a result, the engagement at high-levels remained frozen. During this time, Xi’s outreach to New Delhi’s neighbors increased. He visited Nepal immediately after Mamallapuram Summit with Modi. It demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to engage closely with small Asian countries around India while still keeping the dialogue option open with New Delhi. Moreover, Xi attended the G20 Summit in Bali and SCO Summit in Samarkand. He also strengthened China’s bilateral engagement with Central Asian Countries and Moscow. It shows Xi’s diplomatic engagement around the world. However, New Delhi was absent from Xi’s travel plans. This implies that rather than being a true reset in relations with India, the limited interaction between Xi and Modi should be viewed as a component of China’s diplomatic agenda.
Secondly, it is important to underscore that meetings between the two leaders did not arose as a result of direct bilateral channels but came up entirely on the sidelines of multilateral platforms. For instance, the much-discussed Modi-Xi meeting that resulted in breakthrough took place in Kazan during the BRICS Summit in October 2024 rather than in Beijing or New Delhi. Moreover, the foundation was quietly laid in the background. Disengagement at Depsang and Demchok was made possible by negotiations between China’s Wang Yi and India’s NSA Doval in Beijing regarding the boundary issue. In short, summits and crisis management are driving the engagement rather than a deliberate decision to normalize relations. If relations were actually improving, the leaders would be meeting in person in Beijing or New Delhi rather than on the sidelines in a third country.
Furthermore, the main source of tension is still the unresolved border dispute between China and India. The two sides have opted for different approaches. Beijing wants to Compartmentalize this issue. The Chinese side contends that even while the border dispute is important, the rest of the relationship should not be jeopardized. China also wants to work with Indian side particularly in areas like trade and in international organizations like the SCO and BRICS. It also relies on diplomacy to manage differences along the LAC. However, Modi government approached this issue differently. New Delhi has insisted that in order to make progress elsewhere, peace at the border and the restoration of the status quo must come first. Thus, the sequencing of the talks is not the only factor. It’s a deeper clash between opposing viewpoints. Beijing uses compartmentalization to shield its wider strategic and economic interests from the border dispute. New Delhi views the loss of trust and stability at the LAC as major irritants that has shaken the foundation for any meaningful engagement with Beijing. This explains why years of diplomatic and military talks have only resulted in disengagement at a few friction points. It means that a meaningful political settlement of the boundary dispute is still a long way off. Therefore, the LAC’s limited stability has not translated into a return to normal ties. It is evident that diplomacy would not resolve the larger strategic differences on its own without consensus on how to address the underlying border tensions.
Another aspect that is sometimes overlooked is how much New Delhi’s own approach on the border issue has evolved since 2020. The clash in the Galwan Valley was a wake-up call for India. For many years, New Delhi had been wary of constructing roads close to the LAC. This drastically changed after 2020. Modi’s government pushed one of the largest border infrastructure projects in decades. It has completed the Sela and Nechipu tunnels in Arunachal Pradesh and improved the strategically vital Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat-beg-Oldie Road (DS-DBO). Additionally, they fast-tracked new feeder highways, constructed new outposts, bridges, and helipads. As a result, India’s all-weather movement in vulnerable sectors has improved. On the other hand, Chinese side has continued to modernize its own border infrastructure too. At the same time, both Asian power’s view border connectivity as more than just development. They see it as a fundamental security need. Moreover, the two sides have maintained significant military and logistical build-up. It shows that the recent disengagement is crisis management and preparation for ongoing competition.
Furthermore, this competition is currently taking place in the South Asian Region as well. China’s growing influence in South Asia through investments, connectivity initiatives, and deeper strategic ties with small South Asian countries in India’s neighborhood has alarmed New Delhi. India sees this as Beijing’s attempt to expand its influence within what it has traditionally considered to be its “sphere of influence“. However, Chinese side view it differently. There are two major causes of concerns for Beijing. First, New Delhi’s expanding footprints in the Asia-Pacific region in support of the US policies. Second, close cooperation between Washington and New Delhi as an attempt to counterbalance Chinese influence. This has created security dilemma in the region. Defensive move by one state is interpreted as a threat by the other. This zero-sum mentality has eroded the trust. The friction between the two-over host of issues and an overly exclusive idea of sphere of influence will not help them to build a stable and multipolar region.
These regional tensions are now shaped by a shift at the global level under the US President Donald Trump. His foreign policy has shifted from the US’s traditional focus on long-standing alliances. It is far more transactional and unpredictable. At times, Trump has appears to show more interest in courting China than consistent confrontation. Moreover, he wants to assert the US primacy in Asia but often appears unwilling to pay the political, economic, and military costs. This uncertainty under Trump’s leadership to some extent gave both Beijing and New Delhi a reason to scale down their tensions for now. Additionally, both Asian powers understand that letting their competition spiral out of control would be costly for everyone.
However, the perception gap between Beijing and New Delhi hide a deeper problem. In last two years we have noticed a positive trend that Beijing and New Delhi sent a lot of conciliatory messages to each other. Xi mentioned in his speech about “dragon and elephant dancing together“. However, there is a mismatch between the policies of the two sides. China wants to manage differences through reassurance and compartmentalization. But, New Delhi views Beijing with much more suspicion. It no longer thinks the border issue could be kept apart from the rest of the relationship. Additionally, it is still uncertain regarding Beijing’s long-term goals. Although, the signals from Indian and Chinese diplomatic exchanges appear cordial, its strategic worldviews have really become increasingly divergent.
We can conclude from the above developments that this meeting between Xi and Modi is actually an effort to stabilize their ties. They are still far away from normalization of bilateral relations. During last two years, the two sides slowly reopened limited exchanges, restarted patrolling, and resumed talks between Wang Yi and Doval. They are sending positive signals to each other. The purpose behind this effort is to bring back some predictability in their relations. However, complete normalization is a distant dream. They still have pending issues in the form of border dispute and different approaches to handle differences. At present, the effort by both sides is to manage their competition. The optics out of these meetings should not be considered as a convergence of interest. It shows the desire of both states to maintain communication channel open for further talks. Moreover, one thing is certain that if they are unable to get beyond crisis management their relationship will stay the same. To move forward and achieve long-term normalization, they should address the causes of mistrust in their bilateral relationship.
Author: Muhammed Abu Bakar is Research Associate at SVI. He has completed his Master's in Strategic Studies from the National Defense University, Islamabad. His areas of interest include the geopolitical developments in the Asia Pacific Region.