After Pax Americana: The Risks and Opportunities of Multipolarity
Today’s international system is neither fully unipolar nor genuinely multipolar. As Amitav Acharya aptly puts it, it resembles a multi-room theatre more than a chessboard.
Following the end of the Cold War, Pax Americana established a US-led global order. Washington set the rules through its political, economic, and military reach, while its allies— often enthusiastically—reinforced this architecture. For decades, preserving the “rules based liberal order“ became almost sacrosanct for the United States and its partners.
American arguments about US–China competition have generally been framed around defending this supposedly rule-based order. This narrative was most pronounced under President Biden, whereas Trump’s foreign policy approach was more unilateral, transactional, and openly dismissive of long-standing norms.
Meanwhile, China and Russia have for years argued that a more equitable multipolar world is possible. Their evolving strategic partnership—often framed as a “boundless friendship“— has accelerated a geopolitical rupture at a moment when Washington is preoccupied with reclaiming its past prestige. Indeed, Trump’s own slogan, Make America Great Again, implicitly acknowledges that America’s most glorious era may lie behind it.
Academic debates, however, tend to be more sober and analytically grounded. A recent Stimson Center report, “An American Strategy for a Multipolar World,“ makes a striking observation: the United States no longer possesses the resources to sustain the expansive global role it championed in the late 20th century. The report goes further, arguing that Washington must reconcile its ambitions with its reduced capabilities and proactively adapt to an inevitable multipolar order.
Multipolarity, of course, cannot be explained solely through narratives of American decline. China’s meteoric rise—and its emergence as a candidate for global leadership—has played an equally decisive role. The Stimson report emphasizes the rapid economic ascent of populous states such as China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. By 2050, these “emerging markets“ are projected to grow twice as fast as the G7 economies. At the same time, the United States and other developed economies are aging rapidly—another structural constraint that limits their long-term influence.
Following the end of the Cold War, Pax Americana established a US-led global order. Washington set the rules through its political, economic, and military reach, while its allies— often enthusiastically—reinforced this architecture. For decades, preserving the “rules based liberal order“ became almost sacrosanct for the United States and its partners.
American arguments about US–China competition have generally been framed around defending this supposedly rule-based order. This narrative was most pronounced under President Biden, whereas Trump’s foreign policy approach was more unilateral, transactional, and openly dismissive of long-standing norms.
Meanwhile, China and Russia have for years argued that a more equitable multipolar world is possible. Their evolving strategic partnership—often framed as a “boundless friendship“— has accelerated a geopolitical rupture at a moment when Washington is preoccupied with reclaiming its past prestige. Indeed, Trump’s own slogan, Make America Great Again, implicitly acknowledges that America’s most glorious era may lie behind it.
Academic debates, however, tend to be more sober and analytically grounded. A recent Stimson Center report, “An American Strategy for a Multipolar World,“ makes a striking observation: the United States no longer possesses the resources to sustain the expansive global role it championed in the late 20th century. The report goes further, arguing that Washington must reconcile its ambitions with its reduced capabilities and proactively adapt to an inevitable multipolar order.
Multipolarity, of course, cannot be explained solely through narratives of American decline. China’s meteoric rise—and its emergence as a candidate for global leadership—has played an equally decisive role. The Stimson report emphasizes the rapid economic ascent of populous states such as China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. By 2050, these “emerging markets“ are projected to grow twice as fast as the G7 economies. At the same time, the United States and other developed economies are aging rapidly—another structural constraint that limits their long-term influence.
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