The Israel Hamas Conflict: An Analysis on Threats and
Security Implications Posed by Iran in the Middle East
Rahat Anwar, Tajmmal Abbas (2024)
Iran's Foreign Policy in the Middle East: A Grand Strategy
Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Mohammad Reza Chitsazian (2020)
ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES
Security Implications Posed by Iran in the Middle East
Rahat Anwar, Tajmmal Abbas (2024)
Iran's Foreign Policy in the Middle East: A Grand Strategy
Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Mohammad Reza Chitsazian (2020)
ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the evolving dynamics of Iran's foreign policy in the Middle East, with a particular focus on its involvement in regional conflicts, such as the Israel-Hamas conflict. Analyzing the works of Mousavian and Chitsazian (2020), as well as Rahat and Abbas (2024), it delves into Iran's strategic alliances and support for non-state actors, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas, as part of its broader geopolitical objectives. The paper highlights the historical context of Iran's relations with global powers and regional actors, tracing its shift from a defensive posture to more assertive interventions post-1979. Through the lens of the Islamic Revolution, the research evaluates Iran’s anti-Western stance, its balancing act with rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia, and its attempts to challenge U.S. hegemony in the region. The analysis suggests that while Iran's alliances and non-state actors have reinforced its regional influence, this strategy complicates prospects for peace. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is identified as a missed opportunity for de-escalating tensions, particularly between Iran and the U.S. The study concludes by assessing Iran’s foreign policy as being shaped by both realist objectives and ideological motivations, contributing to ongoing instability in the Middle East.
Keywords: Conflict, Palestine, Middle- East, Israel, Intervention, USA, Peace,
Security, Region
This paper explores the evolving dynamics of Iran's foreign policy in the Middle East, with a particular focus on its involvement in regional conflicts, such as the Israel-Hamas conflict. Analyzing the works of Mousavian and Chitsazian (2020), as well as Rahat and Abbas (2024), it delves into Iran's strategic alliances and support for non-state actors, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas, as part of its broader geopolitical objectives. The paper highlights the historical context of Iran's relations with global powers and regional actors, tracing its shift from a defensive posture to more assertive interventions post-1979. Through the lens of the Islamic Revolution, the research evaluates Iran’s anti-Western stance, its balancing act with rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia, and its attempts to challenge U.S. hegemony in the region. The analysis suggests that while Iran's alliances and non-state actors have reinforced its regional influence, this strategy complicates prospects for peace. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is identified as a missed opportunity for de-escalating tensions, particularly between Iran and the U.S. The study concludes by assessing Iran’s foreign policy as being shaped by both realist objectives and ideological motivations, contributing to ongoing instability in the Middle East.
Keywords: Conflict, Palestine, Middle- East, Israel, Intervention, USA, Peace,
Security, Region
The articles which are included in the scope of this analysis both center the issue of Iranian foreign policy. The substance of articles are centered around Iran’s relation with world powers, its allies and non-state actors. Since 1979, it was proved many times that Iran had an unique position considering its stance on many foreign policy issues. Its anti-western stance is shaped by circumstance rather than thoroughly considered plan. Articles examined both use qualitative research methods. Both works start out with a historical background. Then lay out the roadmap that led to the current state.
Historical Background
Elements of the current Iranian foreign policy are shaped during the time of the İslamic Revolution. To understand the revolution, one must investigate the reasons behind it.
Beyond dispute, the 1953 oil crisis was an important milestone for the second Pahlavi rule. The course of events that led to a Coup, staged by MI6 and CIA called Operation Ajax was seen as the first major threat with a democratic nature to the Pahlavi regime. The elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh's efforts to nationalize Iranian oil had backfired. During this time Shah had very little involvement and he even left the country for the time being. After the coup of 1953, the authoritarian nature of the second Pahlavi era came forward. Shah’s close ties and loyalty to the west made Iran a dependent nation in terms of conducting foreign policy. The drastic turn of events came with the fear of being a tool for the western world. The state of the Shah regime and its somewhat boneless stance on the foreign policy issues made the clergy and the anti-Shah wing of the country very uneasy. During the 1970s, Iran-Israel relations flourished, the two countries traded envoys when Israel laid out a true government office in Tehran. Israel was seen as the gate that had led Iran to create diplomatic relations with the United States. For the people who are ideologically motivated on the issue of Palestine the actions of the Shah "showed little worry for the Palestinians in his dealings with Israel.
So, in this climate the “hostage crisis“ took place. It is argued that this was the most devastating event in Iran’s foreign relations with the West. But if we are speaking from the perspective of the current ruling elite of Iran, it was an action to prevent a possible American coup. The impact of the hostage crisis was such that some scholars believe it caused the United States to give a green light to Iraq to invade Iran and provide support for Saddam Hussein’s regime. The 8 yearlong Iran-Iraq war was the newly established regimes first one, this early challenge brought an end to the crisis. With the Algerian mediation, Mousavian and Chitsazian argue that there was an alternative way for US-Iran relations. Meaning that had the US applied the terms of the agreement which involved; not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs, but would instead release Iran’s blocked assets, lift sanctions against Tehran and conduct normal relations based on mutual respect, the trajectory of the 40 yearlong dispute would have a different outcome. Iran’s attitude in foreign policy during cold war, around this point on was “neither east nor west. Iran-USSR relations did not have the nature of an alliance since USSR provided Saddam with military equipment and critical intelligence during the Iran-Iraq War. As a rection to the Islamic Revolution Gulf Cooperation Council was formed. GCC became the biggest regional ally to the US during the disputes in the Middle East.
In the “The Israel Hamas Conflict“ missed cues by the Washington and opportunities of peace between the United States and Iran are examined during the period after the Islamic revolution. Until the killing of Qasem Soleimani, both states faced several opportunities to rebuild their relations. Mousayian and Chitsazian claim that the killing of Soleimani sped up the gradual moving process in Iranian foreign policy toward offense from defense.
First one of these opportunities was the Algerian mediation, which Reagan administration clapped back at newly established Islamic Republic. The second one was the Rafsanjani period, who strived to improve Iran-U.S. relations by helping to release Western hostages in Lebanon in the early 1990s and adopting constructive nonalignment during the first Persian Gulf War. Despite this the Clinton administration continued to alienate Iran in the global stage. But regardless, the Rafsanjani period restored some broken relations with the west especially the one with Europe. It is argued that the wasted potential of this period gave birth to the hostile Ahmedinejad administration which froze the conversation of a possible diplomatic relation. The third opportunity was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was administration and suggestions for peace in the middle east. It is a process of compromises on the part of Iran since it had to give up its sovereignty over its nuclear project. It is argued that if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was successful it would have a huge impact on the peace of the region. Also, it could have provided a formula for rebuilding diplomatic relations between Iran and the west. But the Trump administration saw the plan as a huge compromise on the American part ant it was terminated. Killing of the head of the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, certainly did not gave hope for the future of Join Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Great Powers and Iran
During the Iraqi war Iran did not have many great military resources. United States had frozen any previous military deals with the country and USSR was not willing to do it either. So, Iran had to get some military equipment from Syria, Libya, China and even North Korea. Today Iran has considerable military power thanks to its ties with China and Russia. Its methods of reverse engineering and relations with alternative powers made it possible for the country to support its network of organizations.
The cooperation with Beijing started out not so solid since China was helping Iraq at the same time. Syria and Libya were the only Arab states that backed Tehran when Saddam invaded Iran. Also, the Iran-Russia alliance became rocky when Dmitry Medvedev became the president. In this period Russia followed a policy of reconstructing the ties with the United States, which meant that aid to Iran was not an option. Things got better between the two states after the presidency of Vladimir Putin as he had a different approach to the west.
Iran’s relation with China and Russia was not an immediate one, it can hardly be called an alliance during a big chunk of the lifetime of the Islamic Republic. But today China has become Iran’s top trading partner and the main supplier of its military equipment. Likewise, Moscow-Tehran cooperation in the energy sector has been successful. The alliance of the three countries present an alternative for the US hegemony in the Middle East region.
Starting from the Iraqi war, internal and external balancing became very important for Iran. Internally the country started to develop its defense industry and externally it had established alliances with countries. The current relationship between Iran, Russia and China can be seen as the result of this strategy.
Proxies of Iran
After the İslamic Revolution, its ideologies spread in the region and it was shaped around Shiite Islam. The binding factor of religion set the tone of the Islamic Republic and helped to shape its foreign policy. What we call the Axis of Resistance now contain the Iranian backed non-state actors all around the middle east.
With the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran began to support popular resistance forces as nonstate actors. Although Iran used similar tool pre-revolution, they were never as strategic as in the aftermath of the fall of Shah. Badr Organization was the first example of these non-state actors. It was backed by Iran in Iraq during the war and they fought alongside the revolutionary guards. The organization was Shiite and during the dispute it was a tool for Iran to control its counterparty, internally. Since then the organization became a political party that have a significant role in Iraq. There are considerable amount of similarities between the Badr organization and Hezbollah both in terms of their religious background and the circumstances they were formed in. Tehran had exploited Lebanon’s situation as a fragile state in the early 1980s. In 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Shiite militia group Hezbollah was formed, financially, militarily and logistically supported by Iran. Since then the group branched out into a political party. Today Hezbollah holds the most powerful armed forces in Lebanon.
Hamas-the Islamic Resistance Movement-was born out of the intifada (meaning uprising or rebellion) in 1987. Since then it carried out actions against Israel and after 2007 it became the main authority in the Gaza Strip. The group offers; Sunni Islamic fundamentalism and Palestinian nationalism in its ideology. It is the most relevant Iran backed non-state actor today. Since October 7, Hamas became the face of the Palestinian armed resistance while some consider it as a terrorist organization. The reason behind Iran’s support of Hamas relies in Iran’s foreign policy objectives. Israel as the biggest US ally in the region, its spread would mean a direct threat to the Iranian objectives in the Middle East.
Iran Israel Relations
Israel and Iran cooperated on a wide range of issues before Iran’s 1979 revolution. The two countries were united in their fears of Nasserite pan-Arabism and Soviet influence in the Middle East. During the time before the revolution there were existing diplomatic relations between the two states. With the revolution the dynamic shifted from a realist one to an ideologically driven one. The representative of Israel in Tehran left its place to a PLO representative. The importance of Iran on the issue of Palestine was recognized by the Palestinian representatives. The recognition of the PLO by Iran ended with the Oslo Accords which symbolized the surrender to Israel. After this, Hamas became the main actor for the Iran-Israel and Palestine relations. Once an opportunity for constructing strong ties with the United States, Israel now became the “Little Satan“ to the “Incomparable Satan
With Iran’s use of proxies in the region came a similar response from the Israeli front. Israel started to back several groups in the region. Israel has supported a number of organizations throughout the years that are opposed to the Iranian leadership. Tehran claims that several of the groups involved have been designated as "terrorist" organizations. These include European-based Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and some Sunni organizations.
Some Israelis believe that Iran’s access to a land route from Iran to Lebanon to the Golan Heights jeopardizes Israel’s security The position of Iran in this case is a threat to the Israeli causes both directly and indirectly. In a recent video message Netanyahu mentioned the Iranian regime as "fanatic theocrats", which summarize the views of the Israeli government on Iran well. While examining the recent developments it is safe to say that the fundamental dispute between the two states is continuously escalating.
Historical Background
Elements of the current Iranian foreign policy are shaped during the time of the İslamic Revolution. To understand the revolution, one must investigate the reasons behind it.
Beyond dispute, the 1953 oil crisis was an important milestone for the second Pahlavi rule. The course of events that led to a Coup, staged by MI6 and CIA called Operation Ajax was seen as the first major threat with a democratic nature to the Pahlavi regime. The elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh's efforts to nationalize Iranian oil had backfired. During this time Shah had very little involvement and he even left the country for the time being. After the coup of 1953, the authoritarian nature of the second Pahlavi era came forward. Shah’s close ties and loyalty to the west made Iran a dependent nation in terms of conducting foreign policy. The drastic turn of events came with the fear of being a tool for the western world. The state of the Shah regime and its somewhat boneless stance on the foreign policy issues made the clergy and the anti-Shah wing of the country very uneasy. During the 1970s, Iran-Israel relations flourished, the two countries traded envoys when Israel laid out a true government office in Tehran. Israel was seen as the gate that had led Iran to create diplomatic relations with the United States. For the people who are ideologically motivated on the issue of Palestine the actions of the Shah "showed little worry for the Palestinians in his dealings with Israel.
So, in this climate the “hostage crisis“ took place. It is argued that this was the most devastating event in Iran’s foreign relations with the West. But if we are speaking from the perspective of the current ruling elite of Iran, it was an action to prevent a possible American coup. The impact of the hostage crisis was such that some scholars believe it caused the United States to give a green light to Iraq to invade Iran and provide support for Saddam Hussein’s regime. The 8 yearlong Iran-Iraq war was the newly established regimes first one, this early challenge brought an end to the crisis. With the Algerian mediation, Mousavian and Chitsazian argue that there was an alternative way for US-Iran relations. Meaning that had the US applied the terms of the agreement which involved; not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs, but would instead release Iran’s blocked assets, lift sanctions against Tehran and conduct normal relations based on mutual respect, the trajectory of the 40 yearlong dispute would have a different outcome. Iran’s attitude in foreign policy during cold war, around this point on was “neither east nor west. Iran-USSR relations did not have the nature of an alliance since USSR provided Saddam with military equipment and critical intelligence during the Iran-Iraq War. As a rection to the Islamic Revolution Gulf Cooperation Council was formed. GCC became the biggest regional ally to the US during the disputes in the Middle East.
In the “The Israel Hamas Conflict“ missed cues by the Washington and opportunities of peace between the United States and Iran are examined during the period after the Islamic revolution. Until the killing of Qasem Soleimani, both states faced several opportunities to rebuild their relations. Mousayian and Chitsazian claim that the killing of Soleimani sped up the gradual moving process in Iranian foreign policy toward offense from defense.
First one of these opportunities was the Algerian mediation, which Reagan administration clapped back at newly established Islamic Republic. The second one was the Rafsanjani period, who strived to improve Iran-U.S. relations by helping to release Western hostages in Lebanon in the early 1990s and adopting constructive nonalignment during the first Persian Gulf War. Despite this the Clinton administration continued to alienate Iran in the global stage. But regardless, the Rafsanjani period restored some broken relations with the west especially the one with Europe. It is argued that the wasted potential of this period gave birth to the hostile Ahmedinejad administration which froze the conversation of a possible diplomatic relation. The third opportunity was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was administration and suggestions for peace in the middle east. It is a process of compromises on the part of Iran since it had to give up its sovereignty over its nuclear project. It is argued that if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was successful it would have a huge impact on the peace of the region. Also, it could have provided a formula for rebuilding diplomatic relations between Iran and the west. But the Trump administration saw the plan as a huge compromise on the American part ant it was terminated. Killing of the head of the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, certainly did not gave hope for the future of Join Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Great Powers and Iran
During the Iraqi war Iran did not have many great military resources. United States had frozen any previous military deals with the country and USSR was not willing to do it either. So, Iran had to get some military equipment from Syria, Libya, China and even North Korea. Today Iran has considerable military power thanks to its ties with China and Russia. Its methods of reverse engineering and relations with alternative powers made it possible for the country to support its network of organizations.
The cooperation with Beijing started out not so solid since China was helping Iraq at the same time. Syria and Libya were the only Arab states that backed Tehran when Saddam invaded Iran. Also, the Iran-Russia alliance became rocky when Dmitry Medvedev became the president. In this period Russia followed a policy of reconstructing the ties with the United States, which meant that aid to Iran was not an option. Things got better between the two states after the presidency of Vladimir Putin as he had a different approach to the west.
Iran’s relation with China and Russia was not an immediate one, it can hardly be called an alliance during a big chunk of the lifetime of the Islamic Republic. But today China has become Iran’s top trading partner and the main supplier of its military equipment. Likewise, Moscow-Tehran cooperation in the energy sector has been successful. The alliance of the three countries present an alternative for the US hegemony in the Middle East region.
Starting from the Iraqi war, internal and external balancing became very important for Iran. Internally the country started to develop its defense industry and externally it had established alliances with countries. The current relationship between Iran, Russia and China can be seen as the result of this strategy.
Proxies of Iran
After the İslamic Revolution, its ideologies spread in the region and it was shaped around Shiite Islam. The binding factor of religion set the tone of the Islamic Republic and helped to shape its foreign policy. What we call the Axis of Resistance now contain the Iranian backed non-state actors all around the middle east.
With the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran began to support popular resistance forces as nonstate actors. Although Iran used similar tool pre-revolution, they were never as strategic as in the aftermath of the fall of Shah. Badr Organization was the first example of these non-state actors. It was backed by Iran in Iraq during the war and they fought alongside the revolutionary guards. The organization was Shiite and during the dispute it was a tool for Iran to control its counterparty, internally. Since then the organization became a political party that have a significant role in Iraq. There are considerable amount of similarities between the Badr organization and Hezbollah both in terms of their religious background and the circumstances they were formed in. Tehran had exploited Lebanon’s situation as a fragile state in the early 1980s. In 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Shiite militia group Hezbollah was formed, financially, militarily and logistically supported by Iran. Since then the group branched out into a political party. Today Hezbollah holds the most powerful armed forces in Lebanon.
Hamas-the Islamic Resistance Movement-was born out of the intifada (meaning uprising or rebellion) in 1987. Since then it carried out actions against Israel and after 2007 it became the main authority in the Gaza Strip. The group offers; Sunni Islamic fundamentalism and Palestinian nationalism in its ideology. It is the most relevant Iran backed non-state actor today. Since October 7, Hamas became the face of the Palestinian armed resistance while some consider it as a terrorist organization. The reason behind Iran’s support of Hamas relies in Iran’s foreign policy objectives. Israel as the biggest US ally in the region, its spread would mean a direct threat to the Iranian objectives in the Middle East.
Iran Israel Relations
Israel and Iran cooperated on a wide range of issues before Iran’s 1979 revolution. The two countries were united in their fears of Nasserite pan-Arabism and Soviet influence in the Middle East. During the time before the revolution there were existing diplomatic relations between the two states. With the revolution the dynamic shifted from a realist one to an ideologically driven one. The representative of Israel in Tehran left its place to a PLO representative. The importance of Iran on the issue of Palestine was recognized by the Palestinian representatives. The recognition of the PLO by Iran ended with the Oslo Accords which symbolized the surrender to Israel. After this, Hamas became the main actor for the Iran-Israel and Palestine relations. Once an opportunity for constructing strong ties with the United States, Israel now became the “Little Satan“ to the “Incomparable Satan
With Iran’s use of proxies in the region came a similar response from the Israeli front. Israel started to back several groups in the region. Israel has supported a number of organizations throughout the years that are opposed to the Iranian leadership. Tehran claims that several of the groups involved have been designated as "terrorist" organizations. These include European-based Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and some Sunni organizations.
Some Israelis believe that Iran’s access to a land route from Iran to Lebanon to the Golan Heights jeopardizes Israel’s security The position of Iran in this case is a threat to the Israeli causes both directly and indirectly. In a recent video message Netanyahu mentioned the Iranian regime as "fanatic theocrats", which summarize the views of the Israeli government on Iran well. While examining the recent developments it is safe to say that the fundamental dispute between the two states is continuously escalating.
There are two main conclusions that can be derived from the material. The first perspective focuses on the foreign policy and the strategy of Iran. Iranian perspective is explained through two main points; first is that Iran aspires to expand its regional influence through alliances -like Syria- and non-state actors, second is that Iran follows a policy of balancing out rivals such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and United States through military leaps and advanced technologies. This of course makes it nearly impossible to predict a harmonious west and Israel with Iran. Mousayian and Chitsazian argue that a model such as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has the potential of a peaceful region. They also give the most important elements for peaceful, stable and secure Gulf region. These are consisted of these five points;
1) the establishment of a WMD-free zone, regional arms control and security building;
2) the establishment of mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of regional conflicts;
3) preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries in the region;
4) a commitment to non-intervention and nonaggression; and
5) new mechanisms for regional cooperation on humanitarian issues, including the treatment of migrants, refugees and displaced people.
The second perspective draws attention to the inconsistency in Iranian foreign policy. It makes the point that the peace in the region is not possible with the current policy of Iran. The policy of the country on non-state actors is seen as a major problem. Also, Iran’s power over these actors at times can be an overstated one. But it is worth noting that although Iran hasn't always been successful in persuading organizations to follow its lead, it has always retained a sizable amount of influence over its network.This perspective evaluates Iran as a responsible state which should be accountable for using unconventional actors in regional disputes.
The common ground that these two works have is that the current state of Iran and non-state actors, is not a state of peace. What the two perspective differs on is, the extent that Iran can show its national interests. The two aspects of deepening Iran’s regional power (internal and external) suggests that Iran has the right to preserve and extend its position. Anwar and Tajmmal argues that the actions taken via proxies is not valid in this process. On the other hand Mousayian and Chitsazian put more emphasis on the relation between Iran and US and how it can improve. As the two angles see Iran from different perspectives -one as a security threat and the other as a realist state- it can be said that the two works differ on the status of Iran.
1) the establishment of a WMD-free zone, regional arms control and security building;
2) the establishment of mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of regional conflicts;
3) preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries in the region;
4) a commitment to non-intervention and nonaggression; and
5) new mechanisms for regional cooperation on humanitarian issues, including the treatment of migrants, refugees and displaced people.
The second perspective draws attention to the inconsistency in Iranian foreign policy. It makes the point that the peace in the region is not possible with the current policy of Iran. The policy of the country on non-state actors is seen as a major problem. Also, Iran’s power over these actors at times can be an overstated one. But it is worth noting that although Iran hasn't always been successful in persuading organizations to follow its lead, it has always retained a sizable amount of influence over its network.This perspective evaluates Iran as a responsible state which should be accountable for using unconventional actors in regional disputes.
The common ground that these two works have is that the current state of Iran and non-state actors, is not a state of peace. What the two perspective differs on is, the extent that Iran can show its national interests. The two aspects of deepening Iran’s regional power (internal and external) suggests that Iran has the right to preserve and extend its position. Anwar and Tajmmal argues that the actions taken via proxies is not valid in this process. On the other hand Mousayian and Chitsazian put more emphasis on the relation between Iran and US and how it can improve. As the two angles see Iran from different perspectives -one as a security threat and the other as a realist state- it can be said that the two works differ on the status of Iran.
Historical facts shape the Iran and the Western world relation. It needs to be taken into consideration that Iran-US relations have many layers and this two-sided relationship effect many actions Iran take in the Middle East. From the Iranian perspective US and its allies contain a threat by taking actions against the Iranian objectives. On the surface this argument is one of the main driving forces in Iranian foreign policy and public opinion. In Iran’s case this can be the desire to have a dominance in the gulf region. The defensive nature of Iran can show itself on some occasions in an offensive way. This is interpreted differently in the two articles. While Mousayian and Chitsazian see it as a mix of offence and defense, Anwar and Tajmmal evaluate the situation of Iran as an obstacle for peace.
To summarize; Iran like any other state have its own realist objectives, since the country historically has been on the opposition to the western hegemony, these objectives are seen by some parties as offensive. In relation to the Palestinian question, we can say that Iran’s actions are based on the realist understanding of a state’s hegemony.
References
Abu-Amr, Z. (1993). Hamas: A Historical and Political Background. Journal of Palestine Studies, 22(4), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538077
Chitsazian, Mohammad. (2020). Iran's Foreign Policy in the Middle East: A Grand Strategy. Middle East Policy. 27. 99-114. 10.1111/mepo.12515.
Kaye, D. D., Nader, A., & Roshan, P. (2011). A Brief History of Israeli-Iranian Cooperation and Confrontation. In Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry (pp. 9–18). RAND Corporation. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1143osd.7
The Israel Hamas Conflict: An Analysis on Threats and Security Implications Posed by Iran in the Middle East Anwar, Rahat; Tajmmal Abbas. South Asian Studies; Lahore Vol. 39, Iss. 1, (Jun 2024): 17.
To summarize; Iran like any other state have its own realist objectives, since the country historically has been on the opposition to the western hegemony, these objectives are seen by some parties as offensive. In relation to the Palestinian question, we can say that Iran’s actions are based on the realist understanding of a state’s hegemony.
References
Abu-Amr, Z. (1993). Hamas: A Historical and Political Background. Journal of Palestine Studies, 22(4), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538077
Chitsazian, Mohammad. (2020). Iran's Foreign Policy in the Middle East: A Grand Strategy. Middle East Policy. 27. 99-114. 10.1111/mepo.12515.
Kaye, D. D., Nader, A., & Roshan, P. (2011). A Brief History of Israeli-Iranian Cooperation and Confrontation. In Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry (pp. 9–18). RAND Corporation. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1143osd.7
The Israel Hamas Conflict: An Analysis on Threats and Security Implications Posed by Iran in the Middle East Anwar, Rahat; Tajmmal Abbas. South Asian Studies; Lahore Vol. 39, Iss. 1, (Jun 2024): 17.
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