The eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf region remain an extremely turbulent and unstable neighborhood, where a “Hobbesian“ security environment prevails. There is a general failure of governance and a long list of frequently interacting – and in some cases interconnected – security problems, including several protracted conflicts (1). However, there have been notable exceptions where regional powers have strengthened, and new actors have emerged, driven primarily by economic motivations. Over the last decade, Iran's influence in Middle Eastern affairs has significantly increased, shifting the regional power balance in its favor. This rise in importance stems from cultural, ideological, and geopolitical factors, as well as the evolving nature of threats to international security, such as Al Qaeda terrorism, which has caused wars and divisions in the Muslim world, particularly with Iran's chief adversary, Saudi Arabia (2). The global campaign against Al Qaeda terrorism following 9/11 has ignited new regional dynamics in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, heightening the significance of Middle Eastern issues on international security. This shift has reshaped the roles of both regional and international actors, driven by the interconnected nature of Middle Eastern developments. Current threats now include identity-based conflicts, religious extremism, ethnic geopolitics, and the influence of ideology and religion, alongside the increasing involvement of the masses in economic and political spheres. As a result, Iran has become a central player in political-security affairs, especially after the Iraq crisis of 2003. The present situation in the Middle East has provided Iran with unprecedented opportunities to leverage its advantageous geopolitical and cultural positions, thereby enhancing its regional and international influence. Furthermore, the geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, manifested through various proxy wars, has further destabilized the region. Meanwhile, new actors like China are attempting to influence regional security as traditional powers like the US decline. In this way, Iran is seeking to exert significant influence in the Middle East through its territory, population, and culture, but primarily through its substantial hydrocarbon resources. These resources provide leverage over buyers and the financial means to develop weapons programs and finance destabilizing activities, such as those conducted by terrorist groups like Hamas in 1A "Hobbesian" security environment refers to a state of affairs characterized by pervasive distrust, fear, and competition, where entities (such as states or individuals) are in constant conflict or threat of conflict, each seeking to ensure their own survival. This term is derived from the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, particularly his views expressed in his seminal work "Leviathan" (1651). 2 Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and possibly the Young Believers (the armed wing of the Al Houthi, members of the Zaidi minority) in Yemen (3). Iranian diplomacy is also striving to break free from international constraints. The strategic relationship with China is particularly significant in this context: oil and gas in exchange for a strategic partnership, which could even include the establishment of a Chinese base in an Iranian port or on an Iranian island. The importance of Iran’s relationships with its neighbors — from Türkiye in the northwest to the Arab states to its south — is a central aspect of its regional policy. These interactions are characterized by a complex mix of cooperation and competition, with significant implications for the region’s stability and security. Iran’s engagement with its neighbors has been volatile, combining antagonistic rhetoric with dialogue and strategic maneuvering. Therefore, Iran’s role in the Middle East is both historical and evolving, marked by a strategic interplay of religion, ideology, politics, and regional dynamics. Positioned at the heart of crucial geopolitical intersections, Iran’s actions have far-reaching consequences that resonate throughout the region and beyond.
IRAN’S POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Long before 2011, Iran was already present in the Middle East. As early as 1982, following the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, where Shiites are numerous, the Iranian government decided to support them by creating Hezbollah2. Indeed, it was Hezbollah fighters, trained by Iranian officers, who dealt a (semi-)defeat to the IDF in 2006, significantly boosting their prestige among Arab public opinion, particularly the Palestinian public. From 2011 onwards, with the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, Iran was able to establish itself as a major player in the Middle East's geopolitical dynamics. President Barack Obama's decision to withdraw most American troops from Iraq gave Iranians free rein to intervene even more strongly in Iraq. It is worth noting that Shiites are the majority in Iraq, and it hosts the most important Shiite pilgrimage sites. Additionally, 2011 marks the beginning of the Iranian government's unwavering support for its loyal Syrian ally, Bashar al-Assad, from 2Hezbollah, or "Party of God," is a Shia Islamist political, military, and social organization based in Lebanon. It was founded in the early 1980s, primarily as a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, with the support of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Hezbollah is designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, including the United States, Israel, and members of the European Union. However, some countries, including Russia and China, do not label it as such and engage with its political representatives. 3 the early days of the uprising against his regime. Incidentally, since the conflict between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988, the Syrian government has been an ally of Iran, with Iraq being perceived as a threat to its own sovereignty (4). Iran is primarily attempting to assert itself by leveraging the religious factor. It has created a Shiite axis through its military presence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Crucially, this Axis allows Iran to project power and influence beyond its borders while reducing the risk of direct confrontation with key adversaries like the United States and Israel. Although in practice it is more of an "archipelago," as Bernard Hourcade explains, because Iranians are far from being able to control a continuous territory between Iran and the Mediterranean coast. The recent involvement of Iran-backed groups, namely Hezbollah and the Houthis, in the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel in Gaza further illustrates Tehran’s strategic positioning within the broader regional context. Additionally, the energy factor is also a crucial element in this complex geopolitical game, and it is the main reason for the Saudi Iranian competition. Since the 1970s, following the oil shocks, Western countries have been dependent on oil-producing countries, mainly in the Middle East. In fact, as a major oil producer, Iran holds a strategic position in global energy markets. Its ability to influence oil prices through production levels gives it leverage in international diplomacy and economic negotiations. For instance, any disruption in Iranian oil exports can have significant ripple effects on global oil prices, affecting economies worldwide. But this situation is now changing. For shale oil production to be profitable, the price of a barrel of oil must be above $60 (it reached $80 on May 17, 2018). Production has resumed vigorously since prices rose following production cuts by Russia and Saudi Arabia, who need to maintain high prices. To keep oil prices high, the best way is to reduce the number of hydrocarbons on the market, for example, by excluding Iran through sanctions. This would be a significant advantage for Saudi Arabia, as its enemy would be weakened, deprived of Western markets (though China and India would remain), and of the much-needed Western oil technology. The ability or inability to export oil and gas significantly impacts Iran's economy. Sanctions targeting Iran's energy sector aim to curtail its revenue, thus limiting its capacity to fund regional proxy groups and military activities. Moreover, Tehran, unable to confront the United States or even Israel directly—given Israel's advanced military capabilities, including missile systems and nuclear potential—has opted for an asymmetric strategy. This is particularly because, from a purely material standpoint, the military balance favors the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) member states with their vast 4 financial resources and sophisticated weapon systems. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which can form coalitions against terrorism, as it has done since December 2015, the Islamic Republic is not part of any military alliance, has not signed a defense agreement with any third state, and does not host any foreign bases on its soil. To counter potential external threats, the Islamic Republic has two means of deterrence. One is based within its territory, the other outside. Domestically, Iran has established a scientific and military infrastructure for missile construction. Initially, Iranians developed tactical missiles with a range of 80 to 750 km, capable of destroying naval targets in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Tehran then embarked on the construction of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles, capable of reaching targets up to 2,000 km away. The other aspect of Iranian deterrence involves using militias, political parties, and other allied organizations outside the national territory in case of an attack, supported by Revolutionary Guards when necessary. With the capability to disrupt operations beyond its borders, Iran could leverage other theaters of operations, dispersing the adversary's resources. Consequently, because of these factors that have relatively isolated the country on the regional and international stage, Iran has prioritized the survival of its regional interests and internal security. Iran’s policy of expanding its regional and international influence through multiple avenues is not solely driven by security considerations for the regime and the country, but these concerns are integral to the ambitions of a state seeking to assert its status as a regional power while avoiding direct confrontation with superior forces. Iranian leaders view the United States and its regional allies—primarily Israel and certain Arab countries—as the most significant threats to their security. This perception has led to a primarily defensive strategy, particularly in response to multiple crises in the region. Iranian regional policy manifests in various forms, including proxy engagements, asymmetric military strategy, and deterrence both within and outside Iranian territory. Whether in Iraq during the American presence, after their departure, or in the Syrian civil war, Iranian armed forces have never intervened directly and openly. In Syria, Tehran’s involvement has been crucial in saving President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and fostering closer Iran-Russia cooperation, later evident in the war in Ukraine. In Iraq, Iran has expanded its influence directly and through its allies within Shiite factions. Iraq has also become a proxy battlefield between Iran and the United States. Similarly, in Yemen, Iran’s support for Ansar Allah (the Houthi movement)3 underscores its strategic intent to extend its influence in 3The Houthi movement is a political and armed movement that emerged from the Zaidi Shia community in northern Yemen. The movement was founded in the 1990s by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, a member of the Houthi family, who was later killed in 2004 during a Yemeni government offensive. The Houthi movement has been accused of receiving support from Iran, although the extent and nature of this support are debated. This alleged Iranian support has contributed to the perception of the conflict as a proxy war between Iran and Saudi 5 the Arabian Peninsula and counterbalance Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Bahrain and Syria. (5). In brief, recent events have altered the geopolitical landscape. With Washington's political influence waning in Yemen and its diplomacy proving ineffective, Iran's position is strengthened by using proxies, making it the dominant power in the Middle East. When considering Hamas in Gaza, Palestinian factions in the West Bank, and militias based in Iraq and Syria, it is clear that Iran has assembled a remote-controlled coalition capable of outlasting the U.S. Bombing Houthi bases, rather than pushing for a ceasefire in Yemen’s protracted civil war, will not change this reality. It is more likely to fuel Tehran’s anti-Western, anti-Israel narrative across the region (6). Thus, the mullahs now have three principal foreign policy aims: to push the U.S., the "Satanic foe" of the 1979 revolution, out of the Middle East; to maintain regional pre-eminence; and to strengthen key alliances with China and Russia. This is facilitated by the restoration of complicated diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.
IRAN’S POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Long before 2011, Iran was already present in the Middle East. As early as 1982, following the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, where Shiites are numerous, the Iranian government decided to support them by creating Hezbollah2. Indeed, it was Hezbollah fighters, trained by Iranian officers, who dealt a (semi-)defeat to the IDF in 2006, significantly boosting their prestige among Arab public opinion, particularly the Palestinian public. From 2011 onwards, with the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, Iran was able to establish itself as a major player in the Middle East's geopolitical dynamics. President Barack Obama's decision to withdraw most American troops from Iraq gave Iranians free rein to intervene even more strongly in Iraq. It is worth noting that Shiites are the majority in Iraq, and it hosts the most important Shiite pilgrimage sites. Additionally, 2011 marks the beginning of the Iranian government's unwavering support for its loyal Syrian ally, Bashar al-Assad, from 2Hezbollah, or "Party of God," is a Shia Islamist political, military, and social organization based in Lebanon. It was founded in the early 1980s, primarily as a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, with the support of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Hezbollah is designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, including the United States, Israel, and members of the European Union. However, some countries, including Russia and China, do not label it as such and engage with its political representatives. 3 the early days of the uprising against his regime. Incidentally, since the conflict between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988, the Syrian government has been an ally of Iran, with Iraq being perceived as a threat to its own sovereignty (4). Iran is primarily attempting to assert itself by leveraging the religious factor. It has created a Shiite axis through its military presence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Crucially, this Axis allows Iran to project power and influence beyond its borders while reducing the risk of direct confrontation with key adversaries like the United States and Israel. Although in practice it is more of an "archipelago," as Bernard Hourcade explains, because Iranians are far from being able to control a continuous territory between Iran and the Mediterranean coast. The recent involvement of Iran-backed groups, namely Hezbollah and the Houthis, in the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel in Gaza further illustrates Tehran’s strategic positioning within the broader regional context. Additionally, the energy factor is also a crucial element in this complex geopolitical game, and it is the main reason for the Saudi Iranian competition. Since the 1970s, following the oil shocks, Western countries have been dependent on oil-producing countries, mainly in the Middle East. In fact, as a major oil producer, Iran holds a strategic position in global energy markets. Its ability to influence oil prices through production levels gives it leverage in international diplomacy and economic negotiations. For instance, any disruption in Iranian oil exports can have significant ripple effects on global oil prices, affecting economies worldwide. But this situation is now changing. For shale oil production to be profitable, the price of a barrel of oil must be above $60 (it reached $80 on May 17, 2018). Production has resumed vigorously since prices rose following production cuts by Russia and Saudi Arabia, who need to maintain high prices. To keep oil prices high, the best way is to reduce the number of hydrocarbons on the market, for example, by excluding Iran through sanctions. This would be a significant advantage for Saudi Arabia, as its enemy would be weakened, deprived of Western markets (though China and India would remain), and of the much-needed Western oil technology. The ability or inability to export oil and gas significantly impacts Iran's economy. Sanctions targeting Iran's energy sector aim to curtail its revenue, thus limiting its capacity to fund regional proxy groups and military activities. Moreover, Tehran, unable to confront the United States or even Israel directly—given Israel's advanced military capabilities, including missile systems and nuclear potential—has opted for an asymmetric strategy. This is particularly because, from a purely material standpoint, the military balance favors the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) member states with their vast 4 financial resources and sophisticated weapon systems. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which can form coalitions against terrorism, as it has done since December 2015, the Islamic Republic is not part of any military alliance, has not signed a defense agreement with any third state, and does not host any foreign bases on its soil. To counter potential external threats, the Islamic Republic has two means of deterrence. One is based within its territory, the other outside. Domestically, Iran has established a scientific and military infrastructure for missile construction. Initially, Iranians developed tactical missiles with a range of 80 to 750 km, capable of destroying naval targets in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Tehran then embarked on the construction of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles, capable of reaching targets up to 2,000 km away. The other aspect of Iranian deterrence involves using militias, political parties, and other allied organizations outside the national territory in case of an attack, supported by Revolutionary Guards when necessary. With the capability to disrupt operations beyond its borders, Iran could leverage other theaters of operations, dispersing the adversary's resources. Consequently, because of these factors that have relatively isolated the country on the regional and international stage, Iran has prioritized the survival of its regional interests and internal security. Iran’s policy of expanding its regional and international influence through multiple avenues is not solely driven by security considerations for the regime and the country, but these concerns are integral to the ambitions of a state seeking to assert its status as a regional power while avoiding direct confrontation with superior forces. Iranian leaders view the United States and its regional allies—primarily Israel and certain Arab countries—as the most significant threats to their security. This perception has led to a primarily defensive strategy, particularly in response to multiple crises in the region. Iranian regional policy manifests in various forms, including proxy engagements, asymmetric military strategy, and deterrence both within and outside Iranian territory. Whether in Iraq during the American presence, after their departure, or in the Syrian civil war, Iranian armed forces have never intervened directly and openly. In Syria, Tehran’s involvement has been crucial in saving President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and fostering closer Iran-Russia cooperation, later evident in the war in Ukraine. In Iraq, Iran has expanded its influence directly and through its allies within Shiite factions. Iraq has also become a proxy battlefield between Iran and the United States. Similarly, in Yemen, Iran’s support for Ansar Allah (the Houthi movement)3 underscores its strategic intent to extend its influence in 3The Houthi movement is a political and armed movement that emerged from the Zaidi Shia community in northern Yemen. The movement was founded in the 1990s by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, a member of the Houthi family, who was later killed in 2004 during a Yemeni government offensive. The Houthi movement has been accused of receiving support from Iran, although the extent and nature of this support are debated. This alleged Iranian support has contributed to the perception of the conflict as a proxy war between Iran and Saudi 5 the Arabian Peninsula and counterbalance Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Bahrain and Syria. (5). In brief, recent events have altered the geopolitical landscape. With Washington's political influence waning in Yemen and its diplomacy proving ineffective, Iran's position is strengthened by using proxies, making it the dominant power in the Middle East. When considering Hamas in Gaza, Palestinian factions in the West Bank, and militias based in Iraq and Syria, it is clear that Iran has assembled a remote-controlled coalition capable of outlasting the U.S. Bombing Houthi bases, rather than pushing for a ceasefire in Yemen’s protracted civil war, will not change this reality. It is more likely to fuel Tehran’s anti-Western, anti-Israel narrative across the region (6). Thus, the mullahs now have three principal foreign policy aims: to push the U.S., the "Satanic foe" of the 1979 revolution, out of the Middle East; to maintain regional pre-eminence; and to strengthen key alliances with China and Russia. This is facilitated by the restoration of complicated diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.
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