

# WARSAW SUMMIT 2016 AND THE EVOLUTION OF NATO'S ROLE IN EURO-ATLANTIC COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION<sup>1</sup>

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## 1. Introduction

The very essence of NATO's role in Euro-Atlantic counter-terrorism (CT) is to protect Allied nations and their citizens from terrorist threat. In the New Strategic Concept (NSC), which was adopted at Lisbon Summit (2010) CT was recognized as a mission by NATO. The NSC specifies terrorism as a direct threat to the security of the Allies<sup>2</sup>. In this regard, Lisbon gave a momentum for further improvement in CT and thus followed by Chicago Summit (2012) in which NATO leaders confirmed the new policy guidelines on counter-terrorism titled 'Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future'<sup>3</sup>. The new policy guidelines introduced new developments into NATO's CT agenda. Since then, NATO's role in Euro-Atlantic CT cooperation (CTC) has been evolving par-

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- 1 An earlier version of this research was presented at EISA PEC2017 Conference, Barcelona.
  - 2 Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 19-20 November 2010, [http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat\\_Concept\\_web\\_en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf) (accessed 12 August 2017).
  - 3 "NATO's policy guidelines on counter-terrorism - Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future", 21 May 2012, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_87905.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87905.htm?) (accessed 12 August 2017).

ticularly by establishing new units in intelligence sharing (IS), enhancing the capacity to deter and defend against terrorism and enhancing cooperation with partners and other international organizations (IOs). Although the steps taken were in the right direction, effectiveness of NATO's contribution to Euro-Atlantic CTC is still a matter of debate in the literature. As recent terrorist attacks in Europe have demonstrated, NATO needs to do more in Euro-Atlantic CTC to protect its members.

NATO's effective contribution to CTC matters for its strategic relevance. This argument had been emphasized by many authors including Gordon who states: "while the anti-terrorism campaign changes NATO's character and carries many risks, it also demonstrates NATO's continued utility and provides an opportunity to renovate and give new life to an alliance whose future was uncertain"<sup>4</sup>. Similarly, Lugar acknowledges the role of an effective counter-terrorism strategy regarding the strategic relevance of NATO<sup>5</sup>. As Bennett argues, NATO's strategic relevance is increasingly measured by its contribution to the fight against terrorism.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, effective CT strategy requires cooperation. In other words, cooperation is a *sine qua non* for an effective counter-terrorism strategy<sup>7</sup>. In addition to its vitality for an effective CT strategy, cooperation is also crucial for NATO to remain strategically relevant. Although the importance of CTC has been widely accepted within the literature, importance of intra-alliance cooperation regarding NATO and its strategic relevance has been underemphasized.

Noting that "...effective Transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation among the Allies is the key to maintaining NATO as a strategically relevant organization for their security...<sup>8</sup>", Sadık observed the relationship between the intra-alliance cooperation and NATO's strategic relevance. Thus, this research, by acknowledging the argument above, argues that CTC among the

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- 4 Philip Gordon, "NATO After September 11", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 43, no:4 (2001):89, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330112331343145>
  - 5 Richard G. Lugar, "Redefining NATO's Mission- Preventing WMD Terrorism", *Washington Quarterly* 25,(2002): 13.
  - 6 Christopher Bennett, "Combatting Terrorism", *NATO Review*, 5-7, [www.nato.int/review](http://www.nato.int/review) (accessed 12 August 2017).
  - 7 Sascha Dov Bachmann and Hakan Gunneriusson, "Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century's New Threats to Global Peace and Security", *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, 43 (2015): 77- 98.
  - 8 Giray Sadık, "How Can Counter-terrorism Cooperation Contribute to NATO's Strategic Concept", (*Selected Papers Terrorism Experts Conference*), (2016): 114-128

Allies is essential not only because it is an end itself but also means to an end to achieve an effective CT strategy. In a broader context, as long as terrorism continues to be a threat to the security of the Allies, NATO needs to do more to enhance intra-alliance cooperation against terrorism for the sake of its strategic relevance. In other words, If, NATO, as an alliance in charge with protecting its members, cannot assure the security of its members, it would become strategically irrelevant. Additionally, enhancing intra-alliance counter-terrorism cooperation is crucial to keep NATO as a cohesive alliance.

This article aims to answer the following question: What did Warsaw Summit bring new to Euro-Atlantic CTC since the Lisbon Summit in 2010? To be able to address this question, this article begins with a brief summary of NATO's CT activities between 2010 and 2016. In order to understand NATO's approach to counter-terrorism cooperation, this article will focus on the outcomes of NATO Summits which are important milestones in the Alliance's decision making process since they mostly address the overarching issues which are politically or strategically important<sup>9</sup>.

When studying NATO, "intra-alliance cooperation refers to mutual accommodation among members and active attempts to adjust policies to take the interests of other alliance partners into consideration."<sup>10</sup> Within the context of NATO, cooperation can be measured through assessing three dimensions: Firstly, whether "allies engage in joint operations or offer explicit military assistance to each other" secondly, "whether allies compromise on policy issues, which is then reflected in official statements and documents" and thirdly, cooperation among the Allies can be measured by the level of their economic contributions to the collective defense capability and commitments on equal burden sharing<sup>11</sup>.

By keeping these three dimensions in mind, in the first part, we will focus on Lisbon Summit and its most significant outcome the NSC, Chicago Summit and the new policy guidelines on counter-terrorism and the Wales Summit and the Wales Summit Declaration in 2014 respectively. In the second part, we will focus on the most recent summit which was held at Warsaw in 2016 and its

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9 "NATO Summit Meetings", last updated 9 June 2017, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50115.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50115.htm) (accessed 12 August, 2017).

10 Charles A. Kupchan, "NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining intra-alliance Behavior", *International Organization* 42/II (1988): 317-346

11 *Ibid.* p. 319-320.

outcomes; the Warsaw Summit Communiqué and the EU-NATO Joint Declaration (JD). Instead of giving another detailed summary of NATO's activities, this part will discuss if NATO enhanced Euro-Atlantic CTC?

## 2. From Lisbon to Wales

NATO's role in Euro-Atlantic CTC can be understood through examining the decisions taken in the Summits. In this regard, Lisbon Summit was the most important juncture in NATO's involvement in Euro-Atlantic CTC. The NSC, adopted in Lisbon, was the most notable outcome of the Summit. In the NSC, terrorism became one of the major concerns of the Allies and it was indicated that "terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries"<sup>12</sup>. Major decisions related to counter-terrorism taken in the NSC can be summarized as; enhancing the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, with enhanced analysis of the threat, enhancing cooperation with NATO partners and the EU, developing appropriate military capabilities of the partners and members which includes to train local forces to fight against terrorism on their own<sup>13</sup>. With the adoption of the NSC, Intelligence Sharing (IS) emerged as one of the most significant venues that Euro-Atlantic CTC takes place. Not only the NSC but also the Lisbon Summit Declaration clearly stated that "NATO will continue to enhance both political and military aspects of NATO's contribution to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorism through advanced technologies and greater information and intelligence sharing."<sup>14</sup> Along with this clause, the reform on the framework of comprehensive intelligence concept was an important decision taken on NATO's CTC. As it was identified as a key aspect for countering the terrorist threat -to improve intelligence sharing among the Allies- the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit's (TTIU)<sup>15</sup> functions were taken over by a newly created Intelligence Unit (IU) under the framework of comprehensive intelligence reform. The main motivation behind the establishment of the IU was to enhance analytical approach on terrorism as well as its links with other transnational

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12 "Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", 19-20 November 2010, [http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat\\_Concept\\_web\\_en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf) (accessed 12 August 2017).

13 Ibid.

14 "NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration", last updated 22 November 2010, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm) (accessed 13 August 2017).

15 TTIU was established at Prague Summit in 2002.

threats and to exalt cooperation among NATO's civilian and military intelligence components<sup>16</sup>.

Despite the developments, significant problems remained regarding the intra-alliance CTC especially for two reasons. Firstly, the fundamental tension between an increasingly networked world provided an ideal basis for the emergence of new terrorist groups<sup>17</sup>, secondly, members and their national intelligence and security services are by nature unwilling to share intelligence and information within NATO. As Aldrich argues, member "states will happily place some of their military forces under allied command, but hesitate to act similarly in the area of intelligence, where coordination rather than control is the most they will accept."<sup>18</sup> In this sense, intra-alliance CTC -particularly cooperation in intelligence sharing (IS)-, was hindered by the lack of common threat perceptions and of different national interests. However, members should trust in each other and in NATO itself to coordinate and further develop cooperation in the venue of IS.

Other venues such as Capacity Building (CB) which NATO can contribute to Euro-Atlantic CTC remained underemphasized until the ratification of the new policy guidelines at Chicago Summit (2012). The new policy guidelines on counter-terrorism titled as 'Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future' puts all CT efforts together under an agreed policy<sup>19</sup>. NATO, by introducing the new policy guidelines, acknowledged the lack of a specific policy on CT while recapping the NSC statement which underlines that terrorism is a threat which directly threatens the security of the Allies.

The new policy guidelines focused on the areas where NATO can 'contribute' to the individual efforts of members in CT such as intelligence sharing and capacity building<sup>20</sup>. Thus, it is important to note that the new policy guidelines on CT were designed to complement and to be complemented by

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16 "Intelligence", NATO Multimedia Library: <http://www.natolibguides.info/intelligence> (accessed 12 August 2017)

17 Richard J. Aldrich, "Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation," *International Affairs*, 80/III (2004): 737.

18 Ibid.

19 "NATO's policy guidelines on counter-terrorism Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future", last updated May 21, 2012, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_87905.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87905.htm)? (accessed 12 August 2017).

20 Stefano Santamato and Marie-Theres Beumler, "The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism: Analysis, Assessments and Actions", *Strategic Perspectives* 1 (2013 February):6.

the CT efforts of members and the other IOs<sup>21</sup>. It is clearly stated in the guidelines that “allies acknowledge that other IOs have mandates and capabilities that could enhance Allies’ efforts to counter terrorism”<sup>22</sup>. Accordingly, NATO acknowledged a complementary role led by the United Nations (UN) within the broader fight against terrorism. Thus, the new policy guidelines introduced a new phase of NATO’s involvement in CT based on conformity with international law and NATO support to Allies in addition to focusing on the three key areas of ‘Awareness, Capabilities and Engagement’<sup>23</sup>.

Regarding these three key areas, the former Head of NATO-Headquarters CT section, Dr. Bird argues; ‘Awareness’ ensures the shared awareness of terrorist threat, ‘Capabilities’ aims to reach adequate capabilities of the Alliance to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threat whereas ‘Engagement’ seeks to enhance cooperation with partner countries and other IOs -especially with the EU- to promote a shared understanding of terrorist threat<sup>24</sup>.

With reference to the last pillar, emphasis placed on CB with an aim to repel the geographic boundary of the terrorist threat, beyond the territories of the Alliance, by ensuring a common approach and sharing NATO’s strengths to build the capacity of members and partner countries through education and training activities<sup>25</sup>. In this occasion, NATO launched a number of projects especially under Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS) and the Defense Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). It is worth to note that, education and training activities are significant not only to build the capacity of partners but also to standardize and improve the interoperability of the member countries which in turn strengthens cooperation among the Allies. However, enhancing CTC through education and training activities comes with its own constraints since they require substantial financial and human resources. For instance, NATO Training Mission-Iraq (2004), trained over 15,000 military and police personnel and over 115 million euro’s worth of military equipment and a total of over 17.5 million euros in trust fund donations from members for

21 “NATO’s policy guidelines on counter-terrorism Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future”, last updated May 21, 2012, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_87905.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87905.htm)? (accessed 12 August 2017).

22 Ibid.

23 Santamato and Beumler:7.

24 Juliette Bird, “NATO’s Role in Counter-Terrorism”, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9/II (2015): 2-7.

25 Ibid.

training and education at NATO facilities<sup>26</sup>. The need for additional financial resources have been increasing due to the growing demand for NATO's education and training activities especially for CT. The lack of resources is a constant challenge which in turn raises the most up to date problem; fair share of burdens. In order to overcome this obstacle, at Wales Summit (2014), members agreed to increase their defense budgets and work towards the NATO guideline of spending 2 percent of their GDPs on defense expenditures by 2020<sup>27</sup>. The decision was important not only because it gave an impetus to fair share of burdens but also demonstrated that the Allies have the ability to compromise on vital policy issues.

Besides, Wales Summit decisions affected by the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Thus, NATO took decisions on increasing CTC with their partners in the Middle East through training and defense capacity building. In line with these decisions, NATO has agreed on the Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (DCBI), which includes advising on security sector reform, civil-military planning, cyber defense, military training and civil emergency planning. All of these developments were designed to complement the efforts by the Global Coalition against ISIL, the EU and the UN as well as bilateral efforts against ISIL<sup>28</sup>. By doing so, NATO reconfirmed that it has its own role to play including military cooperation with partners to build their capacity.

Concerning the development of its contribution to Euro-Atlantic CTC, NATO made progress in improving its capability in CT since the adoption of the NSC. The new policy guidelines bolstered the Alliance to regulate its CT activities and CTC between NATO and its partners.

Despite the developments above, there remained problems to be worked out varying from divergent threat perceptions among members to fair share of burdens. These problems, in turn, hamper NATO to play an effective role in Euro-Atlantic CTC. Thus, the Alliance was not able to move from political

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26 "NATO's assistance to Iraq", last updated September 2015, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_51978.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51978.htm) (accessed 18 August 2017)

27 "NATO Wales Summit Declaration", last updated 26 September 2016, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm) (accessed 18 August 2017)

28 "Defence and Security Related Capacity Building Initiative", last updated 27 June 2017, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_132756.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm) (Accessed 13 August 2017).

statements to practical application<sup>29</sup>. Differing views among members hinder cooperation even at fundamental venues in CTC. On intelligence sharing for instance, concerns among members over source protection and potential leaks paralysis cooperation. For example, the Dutch authorities' release of Ibrahem el-Bakraoui –one of the three perpetrators of the Brussels attack- following his deportation by Turkish officials less than a year prior, demonstrates a lack of coordination among the IS agencies of members<sup>30</sup>.

More importantly, differing views among members on what NATO's role should be in CT is the major reason that hinders effective CTC. Some members such as France, hold the idea that the EU is a more appropriate institution than NATO to respond terrorism. As Rees argues, France determined to keep NATO out of the CT arena and advocated that the Alliance should be employed only for collective defense purposes<sup>31</sup>. France's opposition to NATO's involvement in CT has been demonstrated after the Paris terror attacks in November 2015. France, instead of invoking the Art. V of the North Atlantic Treaty, favored to invoke the EU's 42.7 Article in response to the attacks.<sup>32</sup> This perspective not only hinders CTC but also threatens the very essence of the Alliance which is 'collective defense'. Collective defense, requires both shared perception of threat and mutual solidarity.

Some members also disagree on what appropriate response should be to terrorism, with some more willing than others to endorse military action. Whereas the United States (US) favors an active involvement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region; European Allies favor pursuing a more watchful attitude. Although a few European allies -especially France and the United Kingdom (UK) - have been conducting air strikes against ISIL, others

29 Giray Sadık. 121.

30 "FBI warned Dutch about El Bakroui brothers week before Brussels attack", last updated March 29, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belgium-blast-netherlands/fbi-warned-dutch-about-el-bakraoui-brothers-week-before-brussels-attacks-idUSKCN0WV1ZY>

31 Wyn Rees, *Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative* (Routledge, 2007): 46.

32 Article 42.7 of EU Treaty: "if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter". ([http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses\\_/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf) (accessed 28 August 2017), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/france-invokes-eu-article-427-what-does-it-mean> (accessed 28 August 2017).

such as Germany were against such direct military engagement in the region until 2015<sup>33</sup>.

Accordingly, NATO, in order to remain as a credible alliance and be able to respond terrorism effectively, members should adhere to the Art. V and Art. IV of the founding treaty which is ‘collective defense’ and ‘consultations among members’ respectively. Thus, NATO must take action and rebuild the trust, cohesion and solidarity among members by enhancing intra-alliance CTC. Within this context, Warsaw Summit was an opportunity for NATO to redefine what CT is, what NATO’s role should be to promote Euro-Atlantic CTC and find a way to enhance CTC among the Allies.

### 3. Warsaw Summit: What is New?

Due to the different views among members, NATO has been challenging to carry out new responsibilities in CT and these challenges lead to an inadequate CT strategy. In this regard, these challenges were expected to be solved in the Warsaw Summit (2016). Although the Allies agreed that NATO should continue its supportive role in countering the terrorist threat, the decisions were taken on CT related issues were lagged behind the expectations. Particularly in light of recent terrorist attacks in Europe, members disagreed on what NATO’s role should be in CT and indicated differing views on the issue. Furthermore, shared understanding of terrorist threat among members has still been problematic.

The key decision taken at Warsaw was deployment of the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) at the disposal of the Global Coalition against ISIL in order to enhance its awareness and intelligence sharing against terrorism<sup>34</sup>. In spite of the fact that 28 members of NATO have been independently participating the Global Coalition against ISIL, NATO –as an alliance- has not officially involved. Besides, the deployment of AWACS aims to

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33 “Germany joins fight against ISIL after parliament approves military action in Syria”, last updated December 4, 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/12032948/Germany-joins-fight-against-Isil-after-parliament-approves-military-action-in-Syria.html> (accessed 22 August 2017)

34 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué”, last updated March 29, 2017 [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm) (accessed 29 August, 2017)

support the participants of the Coalition. In this regard, deployment of AWACS is politically important since they will provide intelligence and surveillance to the Coalition and thus proves NATO's role in CT as a complementary body within the broader fight against terrorism.

In addition, the most unpredicted decision was the announcement on the extension of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. Although it was planned to withdraw the RSM troops by 2016, it was decided in Warsaw that NATO's assisting and training activities in Afghanistan to support Afghan army to be extended beyond 2017<sup>35</sup>. The RSM aims to provide training, advice and assistance in key areas such as; force generation, force sustainment, strategy and policy planning, resourcing and execution, intelligence, and strategic communications to the Afghan army. It is stated in NATO's official web site on RSM that these efforts are a part of broader engagement in the fight against terrorism to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for terrorism<sup>36</sup>. In addition, the number of troops by Allied and partner nations contributing to the RSM increased from 12, 813 in 2016 to 13, 459 in 2017. The shared sense of terrorist threat as a dimension of cooperation contributes to greater willingness of NATO member countries and partners to join in the increased number of military exercises and deployments in the southern flank. Yet, it is significant to note that the major reason behind the decision to extent the RSM is the recognition that ISIL's emerging bases affiliate in Afghanistan and Pakistan<sup>37</sup>. In this sense, NATO's focus on ISIL and ignorance on PKK which Turkey – NATO's one of the most important members- has been struggling for decades, raising the doubts towards the Alliance in terms of its reliance. The U.S., notwithstanding Turkey's objections, warnings and all diplomatic efforts has been continuing to supply with weapons and support to YPG against ISIL which can be counted as a fraction of PKK. Therefore, NATO's declarations and efforts to create a 'shared understanding of terrorist threat' becomes irrelevant and thus weakens the trust and cohesion among the members.

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35 Ibid.

36 "Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan", last updated May 2017, [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2017\\_03/20170313\\_2017-03-RSM-Placemat.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_2017-03-RSM-Placemat.pdf) (accessed 30 August 2017).

37 "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan" , June 2016 [https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Enhancing\\_Security\\_and\\_Stability\\_in\\_Afghanistan-June\\_2016.pdf](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Enhancing_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan-June_2016.pdf) (accessed 29 August 2017)

Another important decision taken in Warsaw was the reaffirmation of DCBI which was established in 2014 to support Iraq. Although NATO has already trained Iraqi Army, the training activities were carrying out in Jordan. What is new was the decision to train Iraqi Army within the territories of Iraq. Nevertheless, the decision had its own limitations because some members preferred to limit NATO's involvement in the MENA region. France, Italy and Spain for instance, were reluctant to an expanded involvement in the region. However, reaffirming the decision to train Iraqi army within the Iraqi territories is a notable improvement for NATO and for its role in Euro-Atlantic CTC as it facilitates a broader commitment by the North American and European Allies that it balances different Allied views on capacity building efforts which in turn demonstrates that the Allies are able to cooperate even on the most conflictual issues.

Concerning IS, establishment of a new 'joint intelligence and security division' (JISD) which aims to support the NAC and Military Committee on intelligence was a notable development. Establishment of JISD is important since NATO does not have the authority to directly collect intelligence. In addition, NATO appointed its first Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security (ASG-I&S)<sup>38</sup> as a result of Warsaw Summit, where the Heads of State and Government stated the requirement to strengthen intelligence within NATO. By doing so, NATO underlined the need to improve cooperation in IS.

Additionally, at NATO Defense Ministers Meetings in February 2017, the creation of a 'Hub for the South,' based at NATO Joint Force Command in Naples was announced. The Hub is a new center "aimed at understanding and coordinating responses to the south."<sup>39</sup> However, as a NATO report noted, to reach effective cooperation in IS has long been an elusive goal for NATO.<sup>40</sup> It is a longstanding fact that, the lack of confidence and coordination among the Allies and their intelligence agencies pose serious challenges to effective intelligence sharing in countering the terrorist threat. For instance, following the terrorist attacks in Manchester on 22 May, 2017, several leaks about the details of the attackers to the American media evoked a crisis between the UK and

38 Jan Ballast, "Trust (in) NATO: The Future of Intelligence Sharing within the Alliance", *Research Division NATO Defence College*, 14:1 (September 22, 2017): 3.

39 "Defence Ministers agree on NATO Hub for the South", last updated 15 February, 2017, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_141114.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_141114.htm) (accessed 17 August 2017).

40 Philippe Vitel, "The Future of Allied Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance", *NATO Parliamentary Assembly General Report*, November 20, 2016: 1.

the US. The UK blamed the U.S. intelligence and security officials as responsible for the leaks. The intelligence and security authorities of the UK declared that they will not share information about the Manchester attack with their U.S. counterparts in order not to engender the integrity of the investigation<sup>41</sup>. Members want to preserve their strategic autonomy in the venue of IS. However, CTC requires cooperative action in IS and cooperative action requires trust among the members. Notwithstanding the view that NATO members are unable to overcome the mistrust and reluctance to engage in multilateral intelligence cooperation, some argue NATO is able to encourage and facilitate intelligence sharing among its members<sup>42</sup>. In this sense, although establishment of the JSID and appointment of the ASG- I&S are important steps to improve cooperation in intelligence sharing, what is required is not only establishing new units but also to promote trust and a better mutual understanding among the members.

The commitments of the member states on equitable burden-sharing -which is a key aspect to determine the effectiveness of cooperation among the Allies- was another important step towards enhancing the CTC. As Jens Stoltenberg stressed, NATO's continuous adaptation requires fairer burden sharing among the Allies. Defense spending in 2016 increased by 3.8 % among the European Allies and Canada and added, however, the average spending of NATO members was still well below the 2 % target<sup>43</sup>. As US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated; "If the alliance is to remain effective, adaptable, and relevant, rebalancing NATO's burden-sharing and capabilities is mandatory— not elective<sup>44</sup>. Fairer burden sharing in this sense, is also crucial for effective CT strategy not only in material terms but also to strengthen the cohesion of NATO. As the strategic relevance of NATO continues to be questioned more often and as its member citizens are becoming less likely to support protect-

41 "Manchester attack: Police not sharing information with US" last updated May 25, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-40040210> (accessed 22 August 2017).

42 Adriana N. Seagle, "Intelligence Sharing Practices Within NATO: An English School Perspective," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, 28:3, (2015): 569.

43 "Remarks by the Vice President and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg at a JPA", last updated February 20, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/20/remarks-vice-president-and-nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-jpa> (accessed 28 August 2017).

44 "Hagel says Europeans should step up NATO support" last updated February 26 2014, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2568403/Hagel-says-Europeans-step-NATO-support.html#ixzz4vo6RVVD1> (accessed 18 August 2017)

ing one another, members by fulfilling their commitments on increasing the defense expenditures would ensure NATO to remain as a cohesive alliance.

In terms of CTC with other IOs, EU is the most important one as both organizations share a majority of members, common values and interests. In this regard, NATO and the EU agreed on EU-NATO JD which aims to give new impetus to the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership<sup>45</sup>. The EU and NATO recognized the Euro-Atlantic community is surrounded by unprecedented security challenges, which require enhanced and comprehensive cooperation between the two organizations. Although the NATO-EU JD does not clearly mention CT, includes references to hybrid threats, including intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response<sup>46</sup> which are connected to CT efforts. Main aim of the JD is to ensure that both organizations have a shared view of security threats, operate with supplementary strategies and work towards unifying their responses to common security challenges<sup>47</sup>. Terrorism, in this regard should be a catalyzer to enhance NATO-EU cooperation. It becomes clearer on CT that neither NATO nor the EU can tackle the terrorist challenge alone.

Hereof, the JD, recapping the need for stronger NATO-EU cooperation and proposing specific measures to give new impetus and substance to the NATO-EU partnership. Despite some improvements since its formal declaration in 2002, the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership has been mostly remained in rhetorical realm and failed to reach its full potential<sup>48</sup>.

Regarding the CTC between the two IOs, talks have been take place since 2010 but to what extent cooperation has materialized is still not clear. What appears to characterize NATO-EU CTC is the divergent views and even competition among the two organizations which inevitably hampers efficient cooperation as the recent political developments in the U.S. have raised the doubts among the European Allies on the reliability of NATO. Most recently,

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45 “EU-NATO Joint Declaration”, last updated July 8, 2016, [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2016\\_07/20160708\\_160708-joint-NATO-EU-declaration.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160708_160708-joint-NATO-EU-declaration.pdf) (accessed 16 August, 2017).

46 Ibid.

47 Attila Msterhazy, “NATO-EU Cooperation After Warsaw”, *Draft Report to Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation*, April 4, 2017. [www.nato-pa.int/shortcut.asp?FILE=4703](http://www.nato-pa.int/shortcut.asp?FILE=4703) (accessed 29 August 2017).

48 “NATO: Warsaw and Beyond”, US and the Americas Programme Meeting Summary, Chatham House, June 9-10, 2016.

US President Donald Jr. Trump's warnings to cut back the U.S. security commitment to NATO and calling NATO as obsolete, and his speeches on not to defend European members of the Alliance who are not sharing the defense burdens, the EU sensed an opportunity to push forward a proposed European Defense Action Plan that encourages greater military cooperation between the EU members.<sup>49</sup> As German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated: "Europe cannot rely on the U.S." and that Germany will work with France to maintain European security<sup>50</sup>. The perceptions among EU member NATO Allies that NATO can no longer maintain their security suggest that NATO is not the only security platform that they can count on<sup>51</sup>. The current situation intended to imply that the Euro-Atlantic cooperation gets weaker and unless Trump reverses his rhetoric, the EU would get its own responsibility for its own security i.e. by establishing its own army. Such internal divisions -even on the main feature of NATO which is to protect the security of its members-among the members certainly, undermines cooperation among the Allies and in turn weakens its strategic relevance.

In a nut shell, as the recent terrorist attacks in the heartlands of Europe have demonstrated, NATO is still beyond to be accepted as a successful organization in countering the terrorist threat. Various disagreements among members, from how to analyze the threats to how to respond them are still important obstacles to achieve an effective CTC. Differing priorities and divergent views are longstanding serious challenges to NATO's role in Euro-Atlantic CTC. Divergent views on how to respond terrorism do exist and it would not be realistic to expect that these differences will disappear. However, the challenge is about to establish dialogue and cooperation among the Allies to, at least, minimize the disagreements among them and to raise a shared awareness of terrorism as a serious threat. Even though the allies are coherent in expressing their concerns about the terrorist threat, they diverse in carrying out the deeds necessary for tackling this challenge. Furthermore, given the recent political developments in the U.S. and Europe such as Trump's description of NATO as obsolete and his

49 "The EU isn't getting weaker – in fact, it's planning to have its own army" last updated August 28, 2017 <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-eu-military-planning-its-own-army-a7916371.html> (accessed 30 August 2017)

50 "Thanks to Trump, Germany says it can't rely on the United States. What does that mean?", last updated may 28, 2017 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/28/thanks-to-trump-germany-says-it-cant-rely-on-america-what-does-that-mean/?utm\\_term=.21b848206f5e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/28/thanks-to-trump-germany-says-it-cant-rely-on-america-what-does-that-mean/?utm_term=.21b848206f5e) (accessed 17 August 2017).

51 Giray Sadık, p.126.

European counterparts' search for alternative security platforms in response, one can conclude that the commitments made in Warsaw to enhance Euro-Atlantic CTC were not able to go beyond the theory.

#### **4. Conclusion & Policy Recommendations**

Major terror attacks conducted by ISIL in Paris, Brussels, İstanbul and more recently in Barcelona have hit the Alliance at home. These attacks have demonstrated that NATO members are ill-suited to confront this challenge individually. Thus, enhanced CTC especially among the Allies is essential to keep NATO as a strategically relevant actor for its members. Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this research, it is now possible to state that NATO did not achieve a significant breakthrough in Euro-Atlantic CTC at Warsaw. Although the Allies engage in joint operations; offer explicit military assistance to each other, and compromise on some policy issues -which is then reflected in summit declarations and other official documents on CT- and agree on the fair share of defense burdens, there is a lot more to do to achieve practical cooperation in CT. NATO's role in Euro-Atlantic CTC even after Warsaw Summit still remains in theory. However, NATO have the potential to transform decisions into effective actions. Articles IV and V of the founding treaty form the basis for NATO's role in Euro-Atlantic CT. Art. IV provides consultations among members. NATO's solidarity and intra-alliance cooperation can be strengthened and enhanced by reinforcing the meetings indicated in the framework of Art. IV which states that the Allies can "consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."

NATO as an alliance should not forget the meaning of its existence which is to protect its' members. So, member states should not let competition, divergent views or lack of trust to hinder intra-alliance CTC. Therefore, it is vitally important that the Allies begin to see intra-alliance cooperation as more than a tradition, a practice but as a sociological entity. Intra-alliance cooperation is embedded in the connective tissue of NATO's structure and it is shaping NATO's strategic relevance

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